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One of the most extreme expressions of prejudice is likening groups to non-human beings. 
Previous research relates disgust to dehumanization of social groups. However, prior studies 
have not examined other negative emotions in relation to dehumanization. We examined whether 
three emotions – anger, disgust, and fear – are associated with dehumanization of social groups. 
In Experiments 1 and 2 we tested these relationships measuring reactions to real groups. We 
found that all three emotions were uniquely related to animalistic and humanity-denial 
dehumanization, but only fear was related to mechanistic dehumanization. Using an orthogonal 
emotion grid measure in Experiment 3, we showed anger to play a primary role in 
dehumanization among a variety of target groups. Finally, in Experiment 4 we manipulated 
whether a novel group was abnormal or harmful, and found that both groups elicited more 
dehumanization than the control group; however, the harmful group elicited dehumanization 
mediated by anger and the abnormal group elicited dehumanization mediated by disgust.  From 
this evidence, we argue that other emotions besides disgust play an important part in the 
dehumanization of outgroups.  
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Not Just Disgust: Fear and Anger Also Relate to Intergroup Dehumanization 
Dehumanization, denying that a social group is fully human, is the ultimate expression of 
prejudice, accompanying the most horrific instances of discrimination throughout history, such 
as slavery and genocide. Numerous studies have demonstrated that social outgroups are thought 
to be less capable of feeling complex, uniquely human emotions, such as pride or guilt (e.g., 
Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes, & Demoulin, 2001). Building on this 
evidence, Haslam (2006) has proposed two distinct sets of human qualities or characteristics in 
social perception, which relate to different forms of dehumanization. People can elicit 
mechanistic dehumanization, being likened to machines and denied characteristics of human 
nature, such as warmth and curiosity. On the other hand, people can elicit animalistic 
dehumanization, being likened to nonhuman animals; here, the characteristics denied are unique 
to humans, such as intellect and self-awareness.   
On a more basic level than the denial of emotions or traits, prejudice can manifest itself 
in mere associations between outgroups and animal-related terms or images, whether measured 
implicitly or explicitly (Viki, Winchester et al., 2006; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 
2008). It is this metaphorical form of dehumanization that we find particularly telling, as it gives 
direct evidence for the denial of human standing to other groups. However, there is debate as to 
whether metaphorical dehumanization merely represents antipathy or dislike, with recent 
findings indicating that metaphorical dehumanization is related but distinct from dislike 
(Bruneau, 2018). We present evidence that not only can humans be ascribed as being animal , 
machine like, or lacking of general human essence, but that dehumanization is associated with 
different hostile emotions, such as anger, disgust, or fear. 
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Research also shows the importance of emotions in intergroup prejudice and hostility, 
particularly anger, disgust and fear (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Given the importance of dehumanizing beliefs and negative 
emotions in prejudice and hostility, we might ask how the two are related. In four studies, two 
correlational and two experimental, we examined the relationships of disgust, fear, and anger 
with dehumanization, showing that they each contribute separately to variance in 
dehumanization. 
Disgust 
Writers and researchers often assert that disgust stands in a special relationship to 
dehumanization. Haslam’s (2006) review proposed that disgust might be uniquely associated 
with animalistic dehumanization, i.e., seeing a group in animalistic terms, while indifference is 
associated with mechanistic dehumanization. Experimentally, Harris and Fiske (2006) found that 
groups perceived as being both incompetent and unfriendly fail to activate parts of the brain that 
are essential for social cognition, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, which they took as 
evidence for dehumanization. Additionally, the insula and amygdala, two parts of the brain 
related to feelings of disgust, were activated in reaction to these groups, suggesting that disgust is 
related to dehumanization. Further research has shown that these patterns of brain activation are 
correlated with specific attributions (Harris & Fiske, 2011). For example, activation of the insula 
was inversely related to perceptions of warmth.  In other research, disgust sensitivity has been 
shown to predict prejudice against groups such as immigrants and foreigners, with 
dehumanization as an important mediator (Hodson & Costello, 2007). In an experimental 
demonstration, Buckels and Trapnell (2013) manipulated incidental disgust in a situation and 
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showed it to increase dehumanization of outgroups. In sum, existing research shows a strong 
tradition of positioning disgust as a precursor or mediator of dehumanization. 
Theories of emotion give several reasons why disgust might be associated with 
dehumanization. There is consensus that disgust helps to defend the body against literal 
contamination by disease (e.g., Curtis, De Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 
2009; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). However, other functions for disgust have been 
proposed to coexist, namely to: a) protect against moral contamination from abnormal acts (e.g., 
Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Rozin, Lowery, 
Imada, & Haidt, 1999), b) defend reproductive resources against abnormal mating choices (e.g., 
Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009), and c) defend the self or group against status 
contamination from hierarchically lower people or groups (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Animals 
are often a vector for pathogens (Curtis et al., 2011). They are seen as ontologically lower than 
humans (Brandt & Reyna, 2011), and do not follow cultural norms when it comes to morality, 
sex, excretion, or eating. For all these reasons, it seems plausible that under the functional 
assumptions of appraisal theory, disgust would follow on from the same kinds of threat 
appraisals that ultimately lead to inferences of animalness in humans.  
Despite their compelling findings, previous studies have only tried to confirm the 
hypothesis that animalistic dehumanization relates to disgust. But dehumanization may be linked 
with other specific negative emotions, because dehumanizing qualities are associated with both 
literal and metaphorical threats and the variety of hostile emotions the threats characteristically 
evoke. For example, while disgust is triggered by threats of contamination (of health or values), 
fear has been shown to be triggered by threats to physical safety, and anger by a variety of 
threats, such as harmful actions or potential goal obstruction (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  
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Additionally, a review suggests that the insula, which has been connected to dehumanization, is 
not uniquely relevant to disgust, but instead responds to any emotion with high arousal content 
(Chapman & Anderson, 2012).  Thus, there are reasons to examine contributions to 
dehumanization from two other emotions often classed as “basic” (Ekman, 1999): fear and 
anger, as they are both high in arousal and triggered by threatening or hostile events.  
Why Fear? 
Not all negatively judged animals exclusively elicit disgust, and the same applies to 
human groups, which can elicit other hostile emotions that emerge from the same threat 
appraisals that can also elicit dehumanization. For example, it seems clear that a tiger, as 
opposed to a rat, is more likely to evoke fear than disgust, due to the attributes of a tiger (i.e., 
potentially violent) versus a rat (i.e., dirty). Some analyses of intergroup fear attribute the 
elicitation of fear to the perception that a group is threatening because of its power or status (e.g. 
Mackie et al., 2000; Giner-Sorolla & Maitner, 2013).  Other theories have linked fear to the 
threat of physical harm to oneself or to the ingroup (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Of these two 
appraisals, it would seem that the threat of harm is more likely to be involved in dehumanization 
via fear. This is because of the expectation that animals are capable of causing harm, which 
underlies many animal phobias (Amoit & Bastian, 2015) – to the extent that reminders of the 
animalistic nature of violence can reduce support for war (Motyl, Hart & Pyszczynski, 2010). 
However, power in general can be expressed in more ways than physical violence, some of 
which are uniquely human (e.g., political or financial power), so the general construct of power 
is less likely to explain any fear-dehumanization link. Similar to the appraisal model in which 
contamination appraisals engender disgust, we think that physical threat could elicit fear, which 
would exist in parallel with dehumanization and possibly also intensify it. 
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What kind of humans, then, might be likened to animals because they elicit fear? In a 
philosophical discussion of evil, Haybron (2002) writes, “Seriously to regard someone as evil is 
to claim him ineligible for any human relationship … The evil person is something of an alien, 
lying somewhere between the human and demonic. We call her, not coincidentally, a monster” 
(p. 277). Evil persons, unrestrained by morality and desiring harm to others, are often spoken of 
metaphorically as dangerous predators – wolves or sharks – or as “inhuman” or “inhumane.” 
Intentional harm poses an intensified threat because the harmdoer is likely to persist, unlike an 
accidental harmdoer. The intent to harm also implies that the harmdoer is animalistic, lacking 
reflection or moral feelings that would restrain the commission of violence. Indeed, evil people 
who threaten harm are viewed with metaphors of animalistic dehumanization (Morera, Quiles, 
Correa, Delgado & Leyens, 2018). So, if fear is related to animalistic dehumanization of a group, 
this might be because the group is seen as morally deficient and evil, like an animal that preys on 
humans. A group seen as having harmful intents and desires instead of the moral restraint 
expected from a human being, we believe, is most likely both to be compared to animals, and to 
elicit fear.  
Why Anger? 
Anger can be elicited within numerous intergroup contexts, and has been linked to nearly 
every kind of threat in Cottrell and Neuberg’s (2005) socio-functional approach to prejudice. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that anger is important when evaluating other groups. 
Most importantly, as with fear, anger can be felt when we perceive that an entity – including an 
animal -- threatens harm to the self or ingroup. Anger has been analyzed in evolutionary terms as 
a display emotion that communicates formidability, or the intent to fight, whether in the context 
of defending a group against a predator or defending one’s own social position against 
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challengers (Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009). Because of this display function, anger is most 
useful if it is keyed to the perception that a social threat has intentionality behind it. Logically, a 
display of anger would not deter a threat without intentionality (such as an avalanche) but could 
do better in deterring an intentional agent, such as an animal or a hostile human. Anger has also 
been linked with a contextual appraisals relevant to intentionality, such as the agency of others 
for a negative outcome (Weiner, 1980), intentionality of wrongdoing in moral situations (Russell 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2011), and perceptions of responsibility when judging criminal behaviors 
(Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999).  Based on these findings, the same appraisals of threat to 
cause harm might lead people to feel anger as well as fear toward groups, and also to liken them 
to animals. 
Animalistic versus mechanistic dehumanization 
So far we have discussed possible links between emotions and seeing other groups as 
animals. However, research to this date has not examined the emotions associated with 
mechanistic dehumanization. Specifically, mechanistic dehumanization has not been studied in 
conjunction with disgust, but is unlikely to be related to that emotion strongly. Disgust, as we 
have mentioned, appears configured to defend us against biological threats. Indeed, disgusting 
animals tend to be disease vectors (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009). Animals also pose a 
disgusting threat by refusing to observe the behavioral codes of human culture (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2008). Machines and inanimate objects, however, are neither intrinsically 
contaminating nor capable of disgusting behavior. With no basis for disgust, and little 
intentionality or responsibility to cause harm from which to derive anger, the main emotion of 
prejudice toward a group classified as “machines” might be fear based on perceptions of their 
power to harm, since being machine-like they do not have the mental capability to perform 
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intentional harm or to spread contagion. Some notable examples from film would be the robot 
assassin in “The Terminator,” the soulless, visored Teutonic knights in Eisenstein’s film 
“Alexander Nevsky,” or the mechanistic imagery surrounding the emotionless Soviet boxer Ivan 
Drago in “Rocky IV.” Recent evidence has found that evil persons, such as terrorists or 
mercenaries, can elicit mechanistic as well as animalistic dehumanization (Morera et al., 2018). 
The authors argue that this is because evil persons can be simultaneously seen as capable and 
also savage-like. Therefore, it is plausible that certain groups can elicit both mechanistic and 
animalistic dehumanization, with the relevant emotion associated with mechanistic 
dehumanization being primarily fear.  
Present research 
Our research examined whether three emotions – anger, disgust, and fear -- are associated 
with dehumanizing attitudes toward groups. Although contempt might also be seen as a basis for 
dehumanization, we anticipated empirical difficulty in separating measures of disgust from 
measures of contempt (e.g., in a cluster analysis of the English emotion lexicon by Shaver, 
Schwartz, Kirson and O’Connor, 1987, “disgust” and “contempt” clustered together at the lowest 
level). Therefore, in only the first study reported here, we examined results with contempt as a 
separate predictor of dehumanization. On the basis of contempt’s poor initial showing as a 
separate predictor, we chose to focus exclusively on disgust in the remaining studies. In Studies 
1 and 2, people indicated their emotions and metaphorical dehumanization beliefs toward a 
variety of real social groups. To ensure a fair chance for the emotions to emerge as predictors, 
these groups were identified a priori as especially likely to provoke attitudes involving disgust in 
comparison to anger and fear, while others were expected to show predominance of anger and 
fear, or elicited disgust and anger/fear equally. We looked at multivariate relationships between 
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the emotions of disgust, fear, and anger and animalistic dehumanization across social groups (in 
both studies). We expected that not just disgust, but anger and fear, would be independently 
related to animalistic dehumanization.  We took a direct approach when measuring 
dehumanization through the attribution of terms to groups that define the human and animal 
categories (Viki et al., 2006). Specifically, this measure enables us to directly test the 
hypothesized relationships between specific emotions and animalistic dehumanization. 
We also tested whether disgust, anger, and fear relate to a lowered tendency to use 
uniquely human terms (e.g. “people”). However, our predictions were less clear for this measure, 
because there are many possible explanations for considering a group less human. Groups might 
be seen as less human because they are classified as animals or machines, as in our other 
measures. But they could also be seen as non-human because they are demonized, 
depersonalized, or objectified; because they are seen as deviating from the human physical or 
mental prototype; or because they are attributed superhuman or subhuman levels of skill, power, 
or other resources (see in general Bain, Vaes, & Leyens, 2014). Nonetheless, we expected that in 
general, emotions which predicted willingness to use non-human categorical terms would also 
predict reluctance to use human categorical terms. 
In the second study, we added a parallel and novel direct measure of mechanistic 
dehumanization, using machine-like rather than animal-like categorical terms. Mechanistic 
dehumanization has not been studied in conjunction with disgust, but is unlikely to be related to 
disgust specifically because machines are neither intrinsically contaminating nor capable of 
disgusting behavior. With no basis for disgust, and little intentionality or responsibility from 
which to derive anger, the main emotion of dehumanization toward a group classified as 
“machines” might be fear at their threatening potential. We also added measures of appraisals 
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theoretically related to the relevant emotion, to gain a clearer picture via mediation of whether 
emotions and dehumanization had any connection independent of appraisals. 
In the third study, we added a grid measurement of anger and disgust (Salerno & Peter-
Hagene, 2013). We used this measure because prior research indicates very high correlations 
between anger and disgust, both in our first two studies and other research (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 
Kupfer & Sabo, 2018; Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007, Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). 
Additionally, we used a between-subjects design, to see whether the effects could be obtained 
without explicit comparisons among different groups.  
 We then conducted a final study in which we manipulated whether a novel group would 
be seen as intentionally harmful, leading predominantly to anger and fear, or as abnormal and 
contaminating, leading predominantly to disgust, to test whether the specific emotions are 
capable of triggering dehumanization in response to these different threat perceptions. We 
predicted that the two groups would elicit similar levels of dehumanization but would do so 
because of the different emotions. We predicted that the novel abnormal group would produce 
dehumanization primarily because of disgust. On the other hand, the novel harmful group would 
produce dehumanization because of anger and/or fear. For all four studies we report all 
manipulations, measures, target groups, exclusions, and sample size determination. All of the 
studies reported in this manuscript received ethical approval from University of Kent’s review 
board.  
Study 1 Method 
Participants 
The study involved 115 participants (25 males, 89 females, and 1 who declined to 
disclose gender) ranging in age from 18 to 53 (M = 20.78, SD= 4.96). Participants were 
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undergraduate students at a public university in England who were invited to participate in an 
online questionnaire for partial fulfillment of a course requirement.  Sample size was determined 
as a function of sign-ups and completed questionnaires within a given term period, and finalized 
prior to data analysis. The sample size was based on a power analysis assuming a small-to-
medium f = .15 effect size, a repeated-measures design with .30 correlation among three 
measures and nonsphericity correction of .90, in which N = 110 would have 80% power. 
Materials and Procedure 
Based on prior studies among our participant population, we chose three target groups 
that had been found to primarily elicit anger and/or fear (“terrorists”, “politicians who made false 
expense claims” – a topical scandal in Britain at the time  – and “illegal immigrants”), three 
groups found to primarily elicit disgust (“pedophiles,” “the morbidly obese,” and “porn 
directors”), and three groups found to elicit both classes of emotions roughly equally although at 
different levels (“the BNP” – a far-right party  – “chavs” – a derogatory term for working-class 
people  – and “students,”  the ingroup, generally low in negative emotions). Incidentally, the 
groups could also be clustered into comparable levels of overall good/bad evaluation:  most 
negative (terrorists, pedophiles, BNP), moderately negative (politicians, obese, chavs) and close 
to neutral (illegal immigrants, porn directors, students). However, extremity clustering was for 
balance purposes only and not examined in our analyses. 
After giving informed consent and gender and age demographics, participants filled in 
repeated measures about each of the nine groups. They were asked how good they thought the 
group was (1= extremely bad, 7= extremely good) and how likeable they thought the group was 
(1= dislike very much, 7= like very much), calculating a general evaluation mean from the two 
variables. Participants filled in emotion scales (1= not at all to 7= very much) asking the extent 
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to which they felt “angry,” “disgusted,” “afraid,” or “contempt” toward the group using single 
items for each emotion. To help interpret each of the four emotion terms, we illustrated each with 
a female-poser photograph of that emotion’s facial expression, taken from materials validated in 
Tracy, Robins, and Schriber (2009).   
Finally, for each group, dehumanization was measured using the explicit scale developed 
by Viki et al. (2006, Study 3). For this measure participants were asked to rate how much eight 
words characterized each social group, using a scale ranging from 1 not at all to 7 very much. 
Four of the words had animal connotations (mongrel, creature, beast, and animal); the mean 
score was used as a measure of the attribution of the animal category.  Four of the words had 
human connotations, reverse scored by subtracting the score from 8 (person, humanity, people, 
and civilian), using the mean as a measure of the denial of humanity. Factor analysis (with 
varimax rotation) confirmed that there were two factors with the appropriate four items in each 
factor, there were no cross loadings over .27 and all items loaded over .76. Reliability analysis 
also confirmed that these scales were internally consistent (Animalistic α =.92; Denial of 
humanity α =.88). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for the nine groups are displayed in Table 1.1 The majority of 
groups elicited equal levels of denial of humanity and animalistic dehumanization, with the 
exception of illegal immigrants, politicians who make false expenses and students. Overall, we 
confirmed our pretesting about which groups primarily evoked disgust versus anger. No group 
elicited primarily fear, and only students (approximately equal on anger vs. disgust) elicited 
                                               
1 For 29 participants the questions pertaining to morbidly obese were labelled incorrectly, thus 
were omitted from the analyses. 
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contempt more so than other emotions though at a low level. Anger and disgust were very highly 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dehumanization and emotion variables for Study 2, with overall correlations between variables 
 
 Animal Denial 
Humanity 
Evaluation Anger Disgust Fear Contempt 
British National Party  3.52 (1.92) a 3.65 (1.62) a 2.53 (1.52) 5.10 (1.78) 5.07 (1.99) 3.12 (1.92) 4.34 (2.09) 
Chavs  2.65 (1.51) a 2.88 (1.35) a 3.18 (1.07) 3.76 (1.90) 3.83 (1.89) 3.26 (1.74) 3.63 (1.75) 
Illegal immigrants  2.07 (1.27) a 2.57 (1.20) b 3.57 (1.02) 3.34 (1.81) 2.70 (1.90) 2.35 (1.57) 2.99 (1.57) 
Morbidly obese  2.40 (1.27) a 2.44 (1.26) a 3.60 (1.03) 3.26 (1.74) 4.14 (1.85) 2.36 (1.61) 3.34 (1.85) 
Pedophiles  4.67 (1.88) a 4.51 (1.81) a 1.65 (1.31) 6.16 (1.49) 6.37 (1.44) 4.15 (2.12) 4.26 (2.49) 
False expenses 
politicians  
2.63 (1.57) a 3.17 (1.48) b 2.87 (1.02) 5.01 (1.64) 4.62 (1.73) 1.99 (1.53) 3.83 (1.99) 
Porn directors  2.70 (1.54) a 2.74 (1.35) a 3.72 (1.09) 2.77 (1.82) 3.69 (1.99) 1.74 (1.38) 2.82 (1.73) 
Students 2.07 (1.06) a 1.80 (0.88) b 5.30 (1.07) 2.10 (1.60) 2.18 (1.60) 1.87 (1.42) 2.96 (1.93) 
Terrorists  4.25 (1.87) a 4.49 (1.77) a 1.57 (1.10) 6.20 (1.40) 5.70 (1.72) 5.34 (1.74) 3.88 (2.40) 
 
 
Correlation coefficients r Animal Denial 
Humanity 
Evaluation Anger Disgust Fear 
Denial Humanity .55  -    
Evaluation -.42 -.53     
Anger .53 .46 -.60    
Disgust .57 .49 -.59 .80   
Fear .46 .39 -.36 .59 .52  
Contempt .21 .10 -.21 .38 .23 .37 
 
 
Note.  Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Different subscripts across the dehumanization variables for each group 
denote statistically different means. Bolded means and SDs indicate the strongest emotion felt toward that group by .10 scale points or more. Only 
descriptive statistics are given for correlations due to the non-independence of inferential tests within multilevel data. We report correlations 





Next we examined whether dehumanization (animal and denial of humanity) was related 
to anger, disgust, contempt, and fear. We transformed the data so that each case represented a 
participant’s response to each group. The data were then analyzed using a mixed model due to 
the hierarchical nature of the questions (i.e., the same questions were asked of the nine target 
groups within the higher level structure of participants). We were interested in the general 
relationships between the emotions and dehumanization at the scenario level, rather than in 
reporting any participant or Participant x Emotion effects. We included fixed main effects of 
anger, disgust, fear, contempt and also the random effect of participant grouping, including 
intercepts for both fixed and random effects.  We found that anger, disgust and fear were each 
unique predictors of both animalistic and denial of humanity dehumanization; however, 
contempt was unrelated to animalistic dehumanization and inversely related to the denial of 
humanity (see Table 2). This could be due to methodological issues (i.e. misunderstanding of the 
term “contempt”; overlap with the term “disgust”), or could indicate that contempt, unlike 
disgust, is more often used as a social emotion towards other people (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 
2016), so does not carry overtones of dehumanization. Significance levels remained the same 
controlling for general evaluation as a covariate, except that the effect of anger became only 
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Table 2. Emotions predicting dehumanization: Models for Study 1 
 





Emotions controlling for GE 
3274.87*** 
 Anger 0.10 (0.03), t= 3.18**, CI .04 .16 0.06 (0.03), t= 1.79†, CI -.01 .12 
 Disgust 0.30 (0.03), t=10.53***, CI .24 .36 0.26 (0.03), t=9.03***, CI .21 .32 
 Fear 0.18 (0.02), t=7.33***, CI .13 .23 0.17 (0.02), t=6.97***, CI .12 .21 
 Contempt -0.00 (0.02), t=-0.13ns, CI -.05 .04 0.00 (0.02), t=0.00ns, CI -.04 .04 





Emotions controlling for GE 
3090.68*** 
 Anger 0.18 (0.03), t= 6.01***, CI .12 .23 0.08 (0.03), t= 2.90**, CI .03 .14 
 Disgust 0.23 (0.03), t=8.52***, CI .18 .28 0.15 (0.03), t= 5.67***, CI .10 .20 
 Fear 0.15 (0.02), t=6.60***, CI .11 .20 0.13 (0.02), t= 5.90***, CI .09 .17 









Study 1 provided initial evidence that disgust does not uniquely relate to dehumanization, 
showing significant contributions from both anger and fear, even controlling for disgust, to both 
the denial of humanity and the attribution of the animal category. Admittedly, there was a very 
high correlation between anger and disgust, but when entered simultaneously, both of these 
emotions as well as fear still contributed independently to predicting both forms of 
dehumanization.  Study 2 extended our investigation by testing whether anger, disgust, and fear 
were related to mechanistic dehumanization as well as the other two kinds of dehumanization, 
animal and human denial. Because contempt was unrelated to the attribution of animal words 
and inversely related to the denial of humanity, it was not included in Study 2.   
Note. For each model 2 Log Likelihood is presented. Chi Square significance tests were used for comparing models 
to the intercept only model. For the individual effects parameter estimates are presented with standard errors in 
parentheses. CI = lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence intervals. GE= General Evaluation. ***  p ≤ .001, **p 
≤ .005, *p < .05, † p ≤.10, ns non-significant.  
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We also included measures of the appraisals theoretically linked with anger and fear 
(threat of intentional harm) and disgust (threat of abnormal contamination). By using appraisals 
as the theoretically specified origin variables in mediation, we could see whether they had 
distinct connections to the emotions and dehumanization types, and whether emotions and 
dehumanization showed any relation to each other independently of appraisal, which would be a 




This study consisted of 135 students from the same source as Study 1, but a different 
academic year (28 male, 107 female).  Participants were between the ages of 18 to 61 (M= 
21.05, SD= 5.22) and sample size was determined following Study 1, with some over-
recruitment. As before, all participants were recruited prior to data analysis. This section 
describes all measures and target groups in the study. There were no exclusions. 
Materials, and Procedure 
Individuals were invited to complete an online questionnaire.  After giving informed 
consent, participants filled in measures pertaining to five social groups: “terrorists,” 
“pedophiles,” “the morbidly obese,” “politicians who made false expense claims,” and 
“students.” Using the same measures as in Study 1, individuals filled in single measures of 
emotions (anger, disgust, and fear), general evaluation, and the denial of humanity and 
attribution of the animal category. Additionally, a novel measure was created to assess Haslam’s 
(2006) concept of mechanistic dehumanization through direct metaphors rather than stereotypical 
traits, using a similar method as the animalistic dehumanization measure. Individuals were asked 
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to rate how much the following words could be applied to each group: “automatic,” “machine,” 
“robot,” and “mechanical,” using a scale from 1 not at all to 7 very much. The mean of the four 
words was calculated as a measure of the attribution of the machine category. We performed 
factor analysis (with varimax rotation), which confirmed that there were three factors with the 
appropriate four items in each factor, there were no cross loadings over .34 and all items loaded 
over .71. Reliability analysis also confirmed that these scales were internally consistent 
(Animalistic α =.89; Denial of humanity α =.89; Machine α =.95). 
We also added measures of appraisals and action tendencies (see Appendix A for full list 
of items). There were three items that, a priori, we thought would measure perceptions of 
evilness and three that we thought would measure perceptions of intentional harm; however, 
these two three-item scales were correlated at r (675) = .87, p<.01, higher than the correlations 
among other pairs of appraisal scales (which ranged from .32 to .67), and did not form separate 
factors in rotated factor analyses for most target groups. Thus, we averaged all six of these items 
into a highly reliable measure, Cronbach α=.95, labeled desire to harm. The next variable 
included two appraisals that assessed power and resources, labeled power, r(675) =.61 , p<.01.  
There were three questions which assessed abnormal nature in terms of literal contamination, 
unnaturalness, and violation of bodily norms, all perceptions associated with feelings of disgust 
(Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999; Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2012). This 
abnormality measure was found to be reliable, Cronbach α=.72.  
Additionally, there were five action tendency items, which we had included to measure 
separate tendencies to punish and avoid the group; however, the two sets of items correlated 
extremely highly with each other, at r (675) = .84, p<.01, and did not form separate factors, so 
were combined into a single five-item scale (Cronbach α=.89)  labeled hostile action.  There 
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were also 5 items of general bad character, which formed a reliable scale (Cronbach α=.79). 
Finally, there was a modified version of the traditional inclusion of other in self (IOS) measure 
for each of the social groups, which was adapted from a scale used by Aron, Aron & Smollan, 
1992. Although not central to this investigation of dehumanization, all three measures (IOS, 
hostile action and general bad character) can be found in the data set.   
Results  
Descriptive statistics for the five groups are displayed in Table 3. As in Study 1, anger 
and disgust correlated highly (.80), with lower but still substantial intercorrelations involving 
fear.  Overall the groups elicited varying levels of the different forms of dehumanization.  
As in Study 1, the mixed model procedure was used to examine the relationship of 
dehumanization with anger, disgust, and fear. Replicating Study 1, we found that disgust, anger, 
and fear were each significant independent predictors of the denial of humanity; significance 
patterns were the same when general evaluation was controlled for, except that disgust became 
non-significant, see Table 4. We also found that each of the three emotions disgust, anger, and 
fear was a significant, independent predictor of the attribution of the animal category and levels 
of significance were the same when general evaluation was controlled for (see Table 4). Next we 
repeated the analysis with the attribution of the machine category as the DV, fear was the only 
significant predictor of the machine category and this was true whether or not general evaluation 
was controlled for (see Table 4).  
 




Table 3. Descriptive statistics of dehumanization and emotion variables for Study 2, with overall 





Human Machine Eval. Anger Disgust Fear 
Terrorists 3.74 a  
(1.62) 
3.94 a  
(1.63) 










Pedophiles 4.31 a  
(1.80) 
4.09 a  
(1.79) 












2.08 a  
(1.14) 
1.86 a   
(1.00) 



























Students 1.82 ab  
(1.00) 
1.65 ab  
(0.90) 















Machine Evaluation Anger Disgust 
Denial Humanity .51      
Machine .45 .33     
Evaluation -.32 -.33 -.16    
Anger .48 .51 .23 -.37   
Disgust .50 .47 .22 -.46 .80  
Fear .46 .42 .34 -.36 .53 .46 
 
Note.  Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Different subscripts across the 
dehumanization variables for each group denote statistically different means. Only descriptive statistics 
are given for correlations due to the non-independence of inferential tests within multilevel data. We 
report correlations across the different groups, rather than within each group.  
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Table 4. Emotions predicting dehumanization: Models for Study 2 
 
 





Emotions controlling for GE 
2310.54*** 
 Anger 0.11 (0.04), t= 3.21***, CI .04 .18 0.12 (0.04), t= 3.50***, CI .05 .19 
 Disgust 0.18 (0.03), t=5.17***, CI .11 .25 0.15 (0.04), t= 3.99***, CI .07 .22 
 Fear 0.21 (0.03), t=7.34***, CI .15 .26 0.19 (0.03), t= 6.47***, CI .13 .24 





Emotions controlling for GE 
2407.48*** 
 Anger 0.02 (0.04), t=.49ns, CI -.05 .09 0.02 (0.04), t=0.66ns, CI -.05 .10 
 Disgust 0.04 (0.04), t=1.11ns, CI -.03 .11 0.02 (0.04), t=0.44ns, CI -.06 .09 
 Fear 0.22 (0.03), t=7.40***, CI .16 .28 0.21 (0.03), t=6.74***, CI .15 .27 





Emotions controlling for GE 
2302.96*** 
 Anger 0.22 (0.03), t= 6.53***, CI .16 .30 0.24 (0.03), t= 6.88***, CI .17 .30 
 Disgust 0.10 (0.03), t=2.84**, CI .03 .17 0.06 (0.04), t=1.61ns, CI -.01 .13 




Next we examined the relationships between the theoretically relevant threat appraisals 
(power, abnormality, desire to harm) and the three emotions. Desire to harm was associated with 
anger, fear, and to a lesser extent disgust; abnormality was related to disgust and, secondarily, 
fear; while the power appraisal was associated with anger and fear (see Table 5). The relative 
relationship of each of the three correlated emotions with the appraisal was broadly in line with 
the theoretical priorities identified in the Introduction.  
Note. For each model 2 Log Likelihood is presented. Chi Square significance tests were used for comparing models to the 
intercept only model. Standard errors in parentheses. CI = lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence intervals. GE= 
General Evaluation. *** p≤.001, **p≤.005, *p<.05, ns non-significant.  
 




Table 5.  Emotions predicting appraisals, Study 2 
 





 Anger 0.29 (0.04), t= 7.50***, CI .21 .36 
 Disgust 0.15 (0.04), t=4.12***, CI .08 .22 
 Fear 0.38 (0.03), t=12.78***, CI .32 .44 





 Anger -0.05 (0.04), t= -1.29ns, CI -.12 .02 
 Disgust 0.34 (0.04), t=9.59***, CI .27 .41 
 Fear 0.22 (0.03), t=7.64***, CI .16 .28 





 Anger 0.29 (0.04), t= 7.27***, CI .21 .36 
 Disgust -0.06 (0.04), t=-1.49ns, CI -.13 .02 





         Mediation Analyses. We examined whether each of the emotions (anger, disgust, fear) 
could serve as mediators between the appraisals (desire to harm, abnormality, and power) and 
the different forms of dehumanization. We performed multilevel mediation analyses using Mplus 
statistical software version 7.11 (see Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 2011; Preacher, Zyphur, & 
Zhang, 2010), entering all three appraisals as predictors of a dehumanization DV (either denial of 
humanity, animal, or machine), and testing each emotion mediator in separate models, using the 
significance of the indirect effect through the mediator. All mediation analyses are reported in 
Figures 1a-1c.  
Note. For each model 2 Log Likelihood is presented. Chi Square significance tests were used for 
comparing models to the intercept only model. For the individual effects parameter estimates are 
presented with standard errors in parentheses. CI = lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence 
intervals. *** p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .005, *p < .05, ns non-significant.  
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With animal category attribution as the DV, in each analysis, total effects were 
significant for both desire to harm and abnormality; however, the total effect for power was 
marginally or not significant for all three of the emotion mediators.  When anger was the 
mediator its indirect effects for desire to harm and power were both significant; however, both 
direct effects were still significant, indicating partial mediation. When disgust was the mediator 
the indirect effects of desire to harm and abnormality were both significant; here too, significant 
direct effects indicated partial mediation. When fear was the mediator none of the indirect effects 
were found to be significant.  
With denial of humanity as the DV, total effects were significant for both desire to harm 
and abnormality; however, the total effect for power was not significant, and this was the case 
for all three of the emotion mediators.  The emotion mediators for the denial of humanity 
indicated similar indirect and direct effects to the animalistic dehumanization analyses, which 
suggests that the desire to harm was explained by both anger and disgust, while power was 
uniquely explained by anger and abnormality was uniquely explained by disgust, again retaining 
significant direct effects indicative of partial mediation.  
When mechanistic dehumanization was entered as the DV, total effects were significant 
for all three of the appraisals and for each of the emotion mediators. For both anger and disgust 
none of the indirect effects were found to be significant, which indicates that these morally 
condemning emotions may not able to explain why the appraisals could lead to mechanistic 
dehumanization.  However, when fear was the mediator the indirect effect of desire to harm was 
significant, in partial mediation given the still-significant direct effect, which suggests that fear 
may explain part of why the appraisal of desire to harm can lead to mechanistic dehumanization. 
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Also, the indirect effect from the power to machine attributions through fear was marginally 
significant; again, the direct effect remained significant, so mediation was partial.   
Overall, these results supported the general idea that abnormality threat is important for 
disgust’s, but not anger’s, relationship to dehumanization, and that fear’s special relationship to 
mechanistic dehumanization has to do with perceptions of harmful desire. The other threat types 
were less uniquely associated with one kind of emotion. The significance of indirect paths also 
established that anger and disgust were related to animalistic dehumanization and human nature 
denial independently from their respective appraisals, and likewise for fear and mechanistic 
dehumanization. Again, these mediation models should be interpreted cautiously as being 
compatible with causal models, but not proof of them, because all measures were taken in the 
same session, unlike an experimental or longitudinal design. To further test claims that mediation 
paths were distinct, we compared the coefficients for nonsignificant indirect effects to the 95% 
confidence interval around significant indirect effects. Where disgust was the only significant 
mediator (from abnormality), the nonsignificant mediators fell slightly outside its confidence 
interval (in both humanity denial and animal dehumanization, .00-.04). Where anger was the 
only significant mediator (from power), the nonsignificant mediators also fell outside its 
confidence interval (in both humanity denial and animal dehumanization, .00-.04). Where fear 
was the only significant mediator (from harm to mechanistic dehumanization), the other 
emotions’ indirect effects fell outside its confidence interval (.06-.10). 




Figures 1a-c. Mediation models for Study 2, with each emotion mediating between three 














Figure 1a: Models showing mediation between threats and animalistic dehumanization via anger 
and disgust, not fear.  Note: *** p≤.001, **p≤.005, *p<.05, †, p < .01, ns non-significant.  
 
 





















Figure 1b: Models showing mediation between threats and denial of humanity via anger and 
disgust, not fear.  Note: *** p≤.001, **p≤.005, *p<.05, †, p < .01, ns non-significant.  






















Figure 1c: Models showing mediation between threats and mechanistic dehumanization via fear, 
not anger and disgust.  Note: *** p≤.001, **p≤.005, *p<.05, †, p < .01, ns non-significant.  
 
 





Study 1 and 2 provided correlational evidence that disgust does not uniquely relate to 
dehumanization. However, there was a very high correlation between anger and disgust for both 
studies; therefore, Study 3 focused on these two emotions and added a grid method which could 
assess both within the same measure (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). Prior research has shown 
that this method helps to distinguish between anger and disgust in situations, such as moral 
judgements, when the two emotions are strongly correlated (Giner-Sorolla, Kupfer & Sabo, 
2018). Finally, each participant only evaluated one group in this study, using a between subjects 
design, in order to avoid explicit comparisons between different groups. We also added short 
descriptions for each group, for instance, to make clear that when we are referring to the 
morbidly obese, we are referring to individuals with a BMI over 40. For this study we used four 
groups: two that predominantly elicited disgust, and two that elicited anger. Within both group 
emotion types we had one group that elicited more extreme responses, and another one that 




186 participants were recruited from Prolific Academic, an online crowdsourced work 
site (for characteristics see Peer, Brandimarte, Samat & Acquisti, 2017). Eight participants were 
excluded because of giving implausible answers to the demographic questions, leaving 178 
participants (106 male, 73 female, 1 did not identify their gender). Participants were between the 
ages of 17 to 61 (M= 28.98, SD= 7.89). The majority of the participants were White (64%) and 
were from European and Asian countries. Participants were provided with reimbursement 
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according to the website’s guidelines. Sample size was determined a priori by using power 
analysis on the basic 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA model. This indicated that 166 participants could 
detect a small to medium effect size f = .15 at 90% power, with some over-recruiting to account 
for excluded participants. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were similar to the previous studies. However, participants 
only filled in measures in reaction to one of four groups: extreme or (Anger: terrorists, Disgust: 
pedophiles), less extreme (Anger: politicians, Disgust: obese). Therefore, the design of the study 
was based on a 2 (group type emotion: disgust and anger) x 2 (group type severity: extreme and 
less extreme) between subjects design x 2 repeated measures (anger and disgust). However, these 
distinctions were mainly a backdrop for our focal hypothesis, which was the relative strength of 
disgust and anger responses in predicting dehumanization, tested via multilevel analyses.  
To measure emotion we used two methods. First, we used an emotion grid system 
adapted from Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013, that had shown preliminary promise in separating 
anger from disgust more effectively by asking people to rate the two emotions simultaneously on 
orthogonal axes of a 5 x 5 matrix. We counterbalanced whether anger or disgust appeared on the 
x or y axis. We also included an emotion face endorsement measure similar to the other studies. 
The general evaluation, dehumanization, appraisal and behavioral measures were the same as 
previous studies. We also included additional hostile action items adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, 
and Glick (2007) and a wider measure of harm, (see Appendix A), which captures different types 
of perceived harm, e.g., psychological and physical. Similar to previous studies we found our 
key dehumanization measures to be internally consistent (Animalistic α =.83; Denial of humanity 
α =.90; Machine α =.93).  




Correlations and descriptive statistics for the main variables can be found in Table  6.  
Using the grid measurement we found a lower correlation between anger and disgust.   
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of dehumanization and emotion variables for Study 2, with overall 





Human Machine Eval. Anger Disgust 


























































Machine Evaluation Anger 
Denial 
Humanity 
.23**     
Machine .65** .05ns    
Evaluation -.08ns -.45** .19**   
Anger .46** .38** .32** -.36**  
Disgust .33** .27** .20* -.35** .64** 
      
Note.  Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Different subscripts across the 
dehumanization variables for each group denote statistically different means. ** p≤.01, *p<.05, ns non-
significant. 
 
We performed a 2 (emotion measured: disgust versus anger) x 2 (group type emotion: disgust 
versus anger) x 2 (group type severity: extreme vs less extreme) mixed model ANOVA to 
examine the emotions felt towards the different groups. We found a main effect for emotion 
measured, F(1, 174) = 7.94, p =.005, η2p = .04. Additionally, there was a significant two way 
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interaction between emotion measured and group type emotion, F(1, 174) = 6.58, p =.011, η2p = 
.04.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that the disgust groups elicited more disgust than 
anger,(Disgust: M= 4.31, SE=.12; Anger: M= 3.87, SE=.13, p<.001; however, there was no 
difference in levels of disgust and anger for the anger groups, Disgust: M= 4.55, SE=.12; Anger: 
M= 4.52, SE=.13, p=.86. The two way interaction between emotion measured and  group type 
severity, as well as the three way interaction were not found to be significant, both p>.18, 
indicating that severity of group type did not play a role.  
We also tested for differences in the dehumanization variables, conducting a 2 (group 
type emotion: disgust versus anger) x 2 (group type severity: extreme vs less extreme) ANOVA 
for each of the three dehumanization variables.  For both denial of humanity and animalistic 
dehumanization both main effects and the two way interaction were found to be significant (see 
Table 7). Pairwise comparisons suggested that for denial of humanity and animalistic 
dehumanization there was a difference in dehumanization levels toward less extreme anger and 
disgust groups but no difference for the extreme groups, suggesting that participants 
dehumanized the morbidly obese the least, and dehumanized the other groups fairly equally (see 
Table 6 for means). However, for mechanistic dehumanization only the main effect of group type 
emotion was found to be significant, indicating that participants dehumanized the anger groups 
more.    
Table 7.  Group effects on dehumanization variables, Study 3: F-statistics and estimated effect 
sizes 
Animalistic dehumanization 
Group type Emotion   21.19***, η2p = .11 
Group type Severity   23.72***, η2p = .12 
Group type Emotion x Severity 6.12*, η2p = .03 




Group type Emotion   18.37***, η2p = .09 
Group type Severity   3.39†, η2p = .02 
Group type Emotion x Severity 0.58ns, η2p = .00 
Denial of humanity 
Group type Emotion   18.64***, η2p = .10 
Group type Severity   5.55*, η2p = .03 
Group type Emotion x Severity 5.92*, η2p = .03 
 
Note. † p ≤.10, * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
 
We then collapsed across all four groups (i.e., both the emotion and severity factors that 
discriminated groups), entering both anger and disgust as predictors of animalistic 
dehumanization in a linear regression model, which revealed anger but not disgust as a 
significant predictor. This effect was also replicated for the denial of humanity and mechanistic 
dehumanization dependent variables, see Table 8. Additionally, the effects were nearly identical 
when general evaluation was controlled for, and if we controlled for group type.  




Table 8. Emotions as predictors of dehumanization for Study 3 
 
DV = Animalistic dehumanization  
  Emotions 
R2 = .20, F(2, 175) = 22.02, p < .001 
Emotions controlling for GE 
R2 = .21, F(3, 174) = 15.51, p < .001 
 Anger .40*** .42*** 
 Disgust .08ns .09ns 
 
DV = Mechanistic dehumanization 
 
Intercepts  Emotions 
R2 = .15, F(2, 175) = 15.39, p < .001 
Emotions controlling for GE 
R2 = .26, F(3, 174) = 20.57, p < .001 
 Anger .36*** .27** 
 Disgust .04ns -.03ns 
 






R2 = .11, F(2, 175) = 10.29, p < .001 
Emotions controlling for GE 
R2 = .22, F(3, 174) = 16.24, p < .001 
 Anger .33*** .42*** 







Similar to study 2 we tested the associations between anger and disgust with the 
appraisals. We found that except for power, the appraisals were predicted by both emotions (see 
Table 9), suggesting that anger was a stronger predictor for each appraisal.  Thus, these results 
do not confirm the appraisal and disgust patterns suggested in the introduction; therefore, further 
mediation analyses were not conducted. 
Note. For the individual effects standardized gamma (multilevel regression coefficient) is presented. GE= 
General Evaluation. 
*** p≤.001, **p≤.005, *p<.05, ns non-significant.  
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Table 9. Relationships between Appraisals and Emotions Study 3 
 
DV = Desire Harm 
  Emotions 
R2 = .54, F(2, 175) = 102.89, p < .001 
 Anger .59*** 
 Disgust .20** 
 
DV = Abnormality 
Intercepts  Emotions 
R2 = .39, F(2, 175) = 55.71, p < .001 
 Anger .46*** 
 Disgust .22** 
 





R2 = .11, F(2, 175) = 15.99, p < .001 
 Anger .39*** 
 Disgust .00ns 
 





R2 = .52, F(2, 175) = 93.18, p < .001 
 Anger .50*** 
 Disgust .29*** 
 
Note. For the individual effects standardized β is presented. GE= General Evaluation. 
*** p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p<.05, ns non-significant.  
 
Study 4 
In our final study, we wanted to show causal relationships manipulating integral 
emotions, by presenting different threat types associated with each emotion, and mediation 
analyses to confirm that each emotion also related to dehumanization independently of the 
manipulation of threat. Showing such links would also strengthen the explanations for specific 
emotion-dehumanization correspondences we presented in the Introduction; that is, that harm to 
the body or rights of others would dehumanize via anger and fear, while social contamination via 
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harmless breaking of sexual norms would dehumanize via disgust. This study presented 
participants with novel groups with threatening appraisal features linked to different emotions 
(i.e., causing harm versus violating norms).  
Method 
Pretest 
 We established descriptions of novel groups that were similar in terms of disapproval, but 
different in levels of condemning emotions, through a pre-test. First, we wrote descriptions of 
seven novel groups (two that posed a literal disease threat, two that violated a bodily norm, two 
that engaged in harmful action and one neutral control group that engaged in sports as a hobby).  
Forty pretest participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) filled in 
items of general evaluation, anger, disgust and fear for each group, using similar measures as 
previous studies. It was found that the disease groups were evaluated less negatively than the 
other experimental groups; thus, we focused on selecting one harmful group and one group that 
violated a bodily norm, labelled as abnormal. One of the abnormal groups (M = 2.07, SD = 0.96) 
and one of the harmful groups (M = 1.90, SD = 0.86) elicited similar levels of general evaluation 
t(39)= 1.19, p=.24, and were also seen as significantly less favorable than the control group (M = 
5.40, SD = 1.47), both ps <.001. Also, the chosen harmful group (M = 5.50, SD = 0.93) elicited 
greater levels of anger than the chosen abnormal group (M = 4.13, SD = 1.95), t(39) = 4.30, 
p<.001 and the chosen abnormal group (M = 6.05, SD = 1.43)  elicited greater levels of disgust 
than the chosen harmful group (M = 5.05, SD = 1.97), t(39)=3.87, p<.001. No other conditions 
were included in the experiment. Descriptions of the abnormal, harmful and control groups used 
in the main study were as follows: . 




Monroes are a group of individuals that have formed a social club/group. They frequently 
engage in sexual acts with family members, such as their siblings and first cousins. It is believed 




Monroes are a group of individuals that have formed a social club/group. They frequently 
damage other individuals’ property. It is believed that they are unlikely to change their 
delinquent behaviors because of the satisfaction derived from the acts. 
 
Control group 
Monroes are a group of individuals that have formed a social club/group. They frequently engage 
in athletic behaviors, in terms of they frequently engage in a range of sports. It is believed that 
they are unlikely to change their sports hobbies.  
  
Participants 
We recruited 129 participants; however, only 121 participants completed the study (73 
male, 47 female, 1 other).  Participants were between the ages of 18 to 66 (M= 31.36, SD= 
10.08). Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for 
payment, 40 cents, and selected for having a 95% HIT approval rate. The ethnicity of the sample 
was predominately White (42 %) and Asian (46%), reflecting Mechanical Turk’s worker pool 
drawn primarily from the United States and India. The sample size was determined before data 
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analysis began, with the aim to recruit 40-45 participants per condition, similar to the per-
condition n for study 3 (on the final sample of 121, a sensitivity analysis with similar parameters 
to study 3 showed that the design could detect a small to medium f = .17 with 80% power).  
Materials and Procedure 
After agreeing to take part, participants gave their informed consent. They were then 
randomly assigned to either the harmful, abnormal or control group condition. Participants were 
then presented with 6 blocks of questions about the novel group (general evaluation, appraisals, 
action tendencies, dehumanization, emotion faces and emotion word items). Blocks appeared in 
a random order. General evaluation, appraisals, action tendencies and dehumanization items 
were measured in the same way as Study 3, except we did not include the additional harm items. 
Similar to previous studies we found our key dehumanization measures to be internally 
consistent (Animalistic α =.77; Denial of humanity α =.89; Machine α =.93). 
We included both emotion word and facial endorsement ratings. For the emotion face 
endorsement items we used prototypical anger, disgust and fear faces involving three posers 
from Beaupré and Hess (2005).  We also included emotion word ratings, including synonyms for 
anger, disgust and fear (see Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). The anger facial endorsement 
measure (AF) had the highest correlation with the anger word terms variable (AW) in 
comparison to the disgust words (DW) and fear words (FW), AF-AW= .74, AF- DW= .62, AF- 
FW= .42,,  and a scale comprised of the anger facial measure and appropriate words was found 
to be a reliable scale (Cronbach α=.94), this was also the case for the disgust items (DF- DW= 
.71, DF-AW= .66, DF- FW= .44, Cronbach α= .93), and the fear items (FF- FW= .61, FF- AW= 
.32, FF- DW= .27, Cronbach α= .85). Fear, in general, was more distinct from the other two 
emotions than they were from each other. However, there was enough distinctiveness that we 
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were able to create emotion indices for each of the three emotions averaging the facial response 
together with each of the verbal responses. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Correlations for the main measures can be found in Table 10. Preliminary analyses 
revealed that the experimental groups (abnormal and harmful) elicited similar levels of 
disapproval but different, appropriate appraisals; thus, the manipulations were successful (Table 
11). However, appraisals of power were similar across conditions, F(2, 118) = 1.42, p =.25, η2p = 
.02. Overall, the manipulations produced the expected emotions. The harmful group elicited 
more anger and the abnormal group elicited more disgust, but there was not a significant 
difference in fear when the other emotions were controlled for (see Table 12). In reference to 
dehumanization, both the abnormal and harmful groups elicited equivalent denial of humanity 
and animalistic attribution, significantly more than the control group (see Table 11).2 However, 
the two threatening groups were not perceived differently from control on the machine category 
(see Table 9); thus, no further analysis was conducted on this variable.  
 
Table 10. Correlations among dehumanization and emotion variables for Study 4.  
 
Correlation coefficients r Animal Denial 
Human 
Machine Anger Disgust 
Denial Human .41***  -   
Machine .45*** .11ns    
Anger .53*** .60*** .18*   
Disgust .58*** .51*** .16ns .85***  
Fear .43*** .43*** .36*** .62*** .59*** 
 
Note.  *** p≤.001, *p<.05, ns non-significant.  
 
                                               
2 Because of reviewer concerns about the possible influence of more negative words in the animalistic 
measure,  (i.e., civilian, mongrel and beast) 
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Table 11. Appraisals and Dehumanization effects for Study 4 






General evaluation 44.46***, η2p = .44 2.08a 2.42a 4.79b 
Desire harm appraisal 55.95***, η2p = .49 5.72a 4.40b 2.21c 
Contamination appraisal 28.11, η2p = .32 4.30a 5.25b 2.54c 
Animalistic dehumanization 11.21***, η2p = .16 3.81a 4.05a 2.58b 
Denial of humanity  14.36***, η2p = .20 4.36a 4.16a 2.60b 
Mechanistic dehumanization 0.21ns, η2p = .004 2.43a 2.59a 2.68a 
 
Table 12. Emotions effs for Study 4 
Controlling for other emotions     






Anger 15.87***, η2p = .22 5.59a 4.16b 4.42b 
Disgust 27.62***, η2p = .32 4.22a 5.75b 4.18a 
Fear 2.35ns, η2p = .04 4.05a 3.16a 3.90a 
Without controlling for other 
emotions 
    






Anger 37.11***, η2p = .39 6.21a 5.31a 2.54b 
Disgust 43.20***, η2p = .42 5.40a 6.19a 2.45b 





Note. Different subscripts across the groups denote statistically different means. *** p≤.001, **p≤.005, *p<.05, 
ns non-significant.  
 
 
Note.  Different subscripts across the groups denote statistically different means. *** p≤.001, **p≤.005, 
*p<.05, ns non-significant.  
 
 




Then, we tested whether specific emotions could explain the manipulation-
dehumanization effects, via mediation analyses using the PROCESS macro procedure (Hayes, 
2013). For each of the mediation analyses, we entered one of the two condition contrasts 
(Control = 0, Abnormal = 1 or Control = 0, Harmful = 1) as the predictor, one of the emotions 
(anger, disgust, or fear) as a mediator, with the other two emotions as covariates, and one of the 
dehumanization measures (animalistic or denial of humanity) as the dependent variable. This 
combination of contrast, focal emotion and outcome thus gave us 12 different mediation 
analyses. We report the analyses with significant indirect paths below, and the other analyses can 
be found in the Supplementary Materials. 
Animalistic dehumanization. When the abnormal/control contrast was entered as the 
predictor, disgust was a significant mediator of its effect on animalistic dehumanization (see 
Figure 1); however, neither anger (Direct effect 0.44, p=.44; Indirect -0.02, 95% CI -.30 .25) nor 
fear (Direct effect 1.01, p=.001; Indirect -0.27, 95% CI -.63 .005) were found to be significant 
mediators (Total effects = 1.47, p<.001). The disgust estimate fell outside the 95% confidence 
interval for both alternative emotion estimates. On the other hand, when the harmful/control 
contrast was entered as the predictor, anger was a significant mediator of its effect on animalistic 
dehumanization (see Figure 1), but neither disgust (Direct effect 0.07, p=.86; Indirect -0.15, 95% 
CI -.36 .02) nor fear (Direct effect 0.68, p=.06; Indirect 0.07, 95% CI -.19 .39) were significant 
mediators (Total effects = 1.23, p<.001). The anger estimate fell outside the 95% confidence 
interval for disgust, but not fear. 




Figure 2. Mediation analyses showing significant indirect effects on the animalistic 
dehumanization DV, † p ≤.10, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Denial of humanity. With the abnormal-control contrast as the predictor, disgust was a 
significant mediator of its effect on the denial of humanity (see Figure 2); however, neither anger 
(Direct effect 0.45, p=.21; Indirect -0.02, 95% CI -.31 .32) nor fear (Direct effect 1.17, p=.001; 
Indirect -0.23, 95% CI -.55 -.005) were found to be significant mediators (Total effects = 1.56, 
p<.001). The disgust estimate fell outside the 95% confidence intervals for anger and fear. For 
the harmful-control contrast, anger was a significant mediator of its effect on the denial of 
humanity (see Figure 2) but neither disgust (Direct effect 0.989, p=.02; Indirect 0.10, 95% CI -
.27 .009) nor fear (Direct effect 1.29, p<.001; Indirect 0.06, 95% CI -.11 .37), were significant 
mediators (Total effects = 1.76, p<.001). The anger estimate fell outside the 95% confidence 
intervals for disgust, but not fear. Therefore, the mediation analyses demonstrated that anger and 
disgust differentially explained, in line with our hypotheses, the effects of the two manipulations 
Emotions and Dehumanization  41 
 
 
on both animalistic and humanity-denial dehumanization; while fear did not clearly play such a 
role, neither could it be distinguished from anger’s role. 
 
Figure 3. Mediation analyses showing significant indirect effects on the denial of humanity DV, 
† p ≤.10, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Discussion 
         Across four studies we found that not just disgust, but anger and fear were independent 
predictors of dehumanization (animalistic and denial humanity). This confirms our suspicion 
that, despite previous research emphasizing disgust’s unique role, other hostile emotions also 
show relationships with dehumanization. The finding that anger and fear are also associated with 
dehumanization further underscores the importance placed on these emotions in intergroup 
contexts (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 
2000). While our method does not distinguish between felt emotions in the moment and 
emotional associations to the group, we believe that the willingness to say that a group makes 
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one feel anger, disgust or fear has its roots in the perception of the group as a threat, forming part 
of an affective attitude that further conditions action and communication regarding the group. 
We recognize that in our studies, anger and disgust were sometimes correlated at a very 
high level (r = .80-.85) which might lead some to question their independence as constructs. 
However, we found that the residual variance from each emotion could still account 
independently for some amount of dehumanization in each of our studies. Additionally, in Study 
3 we used a grid measurement of anger and disgust, which reduced the correlation between the 
two emotions, and revealed anger as a stronger predictor of dehumanization. Also, the 
experimental results from Study 4 corresponded broadly to previous results emphasizing disgust 
as a response to abnormal stimuli and anger as a response to harmful or threatening stimuli 
(Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013).  Moreover, even if anger and disgust had more variance in 
common than not, our larger point stands: the focus on disgust as a sole factor in dehumanization 
may not be warranted, if some combination of disgust and anger appears when anger is measured 
alongside disgust in social contexts. 
Haslam (2006) theorized that individuals are likely to feel indifferent toward 
mechanistically dehumanized individuals; however, to our knowledge, no research since then has 
tested which emotions accompany this perception. The current research indicates that this form 
of dehumanization, where it exists, is uniquely captured by feelings of fear, rather than disgust 
and anger; our Study 4 did not appear to evoke mechanistic dehumanization, mainly because the 
groups selected displayed threats specific to sentient and biological beings. Apparently there is 
room to feel afraid of a mechanistically viewed group especially when it is seen as intentionally 
harming people (the prototype of the robot-soldier comes to mind.) One remaining question is 
whether mechanistic dehumanization without fear can be evoked by non-threatening groups, 
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such as when low-power groups are seen as cogs in a machine or resources to be exploited. 
Because very little research has assessed mechanistic dehumanization directly in the manner of 
Viki et al. (2006, Study 3), more investigation of this kind of prejudicial metaphor may be 
warranted.  
Our measure of animalistic dehumanization yielded interpretable results, further showing 
that the study of dehumanizing metaphors need not use indirect measures such as assessments of 
the target group’s ability to feel emotions. For the target groups examined, any effects of social 
desirability that may have existed among our participant samples did not seem to block 
meaningful variability in applying terms like “animal” and ”mongrel” to disliked categories of 
humans. While animalistic metaphors are a clear and damning expression of dehumanization, 
and were related consistently both to disgust, anger and fear, the denial of humanity is a more 
ambiguous process that can possibly respond to many different kinds of thoughts about what the 
target group actually is, including animal, machine, inanimate, or even demonic metaphors.  
Although we repeat our cautions about over-interpreting mediation analysis when 
mediator and outcome are measured in the same session, the mediation patterns that we tested in 
Study 2 and 4 are broadly consistent with a model explaining the link between emotion and 
dehumanization in terms of shared specific threat appraisals that relate both to negative emotions 
and to dehumanization. In both Study 2 and Study 4, anger mediated between harm threat 
(manipulated or measured) and animalistic dehumanization as well as denial of humanity. In 
both Study 2 and Study 4, disgust also mediated between abnormality threat (manipulated or 
measured) and animalistic dehumanization as well as denial of humanity. Although anger was 
not involved in the mediation of abnormality, disgust was a mediator between harm and 
dehumanization in Study 2, but not Study 4. This anomaly may have been due to the less 
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controlled measurement, rather than manipulation, of harm threat in Study 2. However, it should 
not obscure the overall support for specific patterns of mediation in line with hypotheses about 
threats and emotions. 
In general, our research serves as a caution in the midst of a large and growing body of 
research preferentially examining disgust as a negative moral and intergroup emotion, sometimes 
to the exclusion of other candidates – anger in particular (see literature review in Russell & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Understandably, disgust is a fascinating and intuitively accessible emotion 
to study. There may also be somewhat of a “man bites dog” appeal to the notion that such a 
reflexive and earthy reaction plays a part in moral judgment and social attitudes. However, while 
dehumanization is certainly one prominent outcome of applying disgust to one’s fellow human 
being, researchers should not neglect to follow the trail the other way – from dehumanization 
back to the various emotions and associated threats that can give rise to it. Among other things, 
the more complete picture gives more hope that dehumanizing attitudes can be changed, given 
the apparently greater flexibility of group-based anger compared to disgust (Russell & Giner-
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Desire to Harm (Studies 2-4) 
X are intentionally threatening. 
X are responsible for wrongdoing. 
X intentionally cause others harm. 
X are evil. 
X are malicious. 
X are sadistic. 
 
Additional Harm items for Study 3 
X cause psychological harm to other individuals. 
X cause physical harm to other individuals. 
X cause emotional harm to other individuals. 
X violate the rights of other individuals. 
X cause harm to society at large. 
 
Contamination (Studies 2-4) 
X are unnatural. 
X do strange things with their bodies. 
X contaminate those around them. 
 
Power (Studies 2-4) 
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X are more powerful than the rest of us. 
The rest of us are incapable of coping with the threat posed by X. 
 
Bad Character (Studies 2-4) 
X are unpredictable. 
X are unable to change their behavior. 
X do not want to change. 
X commit immoral acts. 
X are just naturally bad. 
 
Hostile Action (Studies 2-4) 
X deserve to be punished. 
I would like to attack X. 
I would like to escape from X. 
I would like to avoid X. 
I would like to see X exterminated. 
 
Hostile Action additional items for Study 3 and 4 
Say bad things about them when they’re not around 
Exclude them from the rest of society 
Stop them from getting what they want 
Say bad things about them to their face 
Get into a fight with them 
Violently attack them 
Disrupt their activities 
Escape from them 
Avoid them when you can 
Get rid of them 
Punish them for their actions 
 
Positive Action items for Study 3 and 4 (filler items) 
Lend a hand to them 
Join forces with them 
Associate with them 
Cooperate with them 
Protect them from harm 
 
Note. “X” was replaced with the label of one of the five social groups in Study 2 and 3 or 
Monroes in Study  4. 
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